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Countering the Criminal Nature of Immigration
Enforcement: A Proposal to Expand
Constitutional Safeguards
Madeleine Powers
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has maintained that immigration
deportation proceedings are “purely civil” actions and are not criminal
proceedings intended to punish unlawful entry or presence of noncitizens. 1
Given this classification, noncitizens facing deportation are not afforded
many of the same constitutional safeguards as defendants in criminal
proceedings.2 Notably, indigent noncitizens facing deportation generally do
not have a right to court-appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment3;
nor do noncitizens facing deportation have a right to trial by jury.4 Other
protections universal to criminal proceedings, such as the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, and the Bill of Attainder, do not apply in deportation
proceedings.5 Courts consistently state that the lack of protection is justified
because deportation is a purely civil matter.6

1

I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 307
(2000).
3
See Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNSEL
1
(Sept.
28,
2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counsel-immigration-court
[https://perma.cc/U9ET-TGQG].
4
Pauw, supra note 2, at 309.
5
Id. at 309–10.
6
Id. at 310.
2
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The focus of this article is on the constitutional safeguard against selfincrimination. Much like the protections mentioned above, the Supreme
Court has not expanded Fifth Amendment protections to deportation
proceedings.7 While noncitizens facing deportation are free to invoke Fifth
Amendment rights in immigration court, the prevailing rule in civil matters
is that judges may draw adverse inferences from a party’s silence.8 Put
simply, immigration judges may infer findings of noncitizen status and guilt
for crimes when noncitizens “plead the fifth” in immigration court. 9 This is
distinct from criminal proceedings, where a criminal defendant may choose
to not testify, and their silence cannot be commented on by the judge or
prosecutor in front of a jury.10 The lack of Fifth Amendment protections has
potentially devastating consequences in immigration law, as immigration
judges generally rely on the testimony from immigrants facing deportation
in order to establish their status as noncitizens, and consequently, to
establish their deportability.11
Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[a]lthough removal
proceedings are civil, deportation is intimately related to the criminal
process.”12 Nevertheless, the same Fifth Amendment protections that
prohibit judges and prosecutors from commenting on or making adverse
inferences from a criminal defendant’s silence do not apply to noncitizens
in immigration court.13 In recent years, practitioners and legal scholars have
begun to question the lack of constitutional protections for noncitizens
facing deportation in light of the increasingly punitive nature of
immigration proceedings.

7

Tania N. Valdez, Pleading the Fifth in Immigration Court: A Regulatory Proposal, 98
WASH. U.L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2021).
8
Id. at 1356.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1354.
11
Id. at 1375.
12
Padilla v. Ky., 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010).
13
See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1356.
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This article adds to that discussion by arguing for the introduction of
greater Fifth Amendment protections in immigration enforcement and
deportation proceedings. Part II will explore the history of deportation in
the United States and describe the process of present-day criminal
deportation proceedings. Part III will discuss the quasi-criminal nature of
immigration enforcement. Part IV will discuss how noncitizens are forced
to self-incriminate during deportation proceedings, and the effect of
invoking Fifth Amendment protections in immigration court under the
current guidelines. Lastly, Part V will discuss how administrative
immigration agencies may expand the scope of Fifth Amendment
protections to the immigration system through a process called
“administrative constitutionalism.” The expansion of Fifth Amendment
protections focuses on two areas in particular. First, this article suggests that
immigration agents at United States borders be required to read Miranda
warnings to detained noncitizens, either actual or suspected. This is
intended to build on the second proposal first set forth by Tania Valdez in
the article Pleading the Fifth in Immigration Court: A Regulatory Proposal.
Both this article and Valdez’s suggest adding language to the Code of
Federal Regulations that will limit judges’ ability to draw adverse
inferences when noncitizens invoke the right to remain silent in
immigration court.14 The two proposed regulations will ensure that
noncitizens are not coerced or forced into self-incrimination either during
interactions with immigration enforcement officers or in immigration court.
This proposal is appropriate considering the increasingly punitive nature of
immigration enforcement.

14

See id.
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II. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CRIME-BASED DEPORTATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Immigration to the United States was largely unrestrained during the first
century of the country’s founding,15 when immigration law was the
province of the states, not the federal government.16 It was not until 1875
that the Supreme Court recognized immigration regulations as exclusively
the province of the federal government.17 One cannot discuss the history of
immigration laws in the United States without acknowledging its deep roots
in racism and xenophobia.18 For example, when Congress passed the
Naturalization Act in 1790, the statute excluded People of Color from
eligibility to naturalize, specifying that naturalization requirements included
an applicant having two years of residence in the country, possessing “good
moral character,” and being a “free white person.”19 Congress’s intention in
passing this statute was to exclude Black Americans, rather than immigrants
of color, from obtaining citizenship.20 However, subsequent immigration
laws similarly sought to promote the whiteness of the United States
population.21 Notably, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 excluded Chinese
laborers from the United States for ten years, and subsequent country
quotas effectively served as tools of mass racial engineering for years.22 In
fact, federal immigration laws contained explicit racial barriers to
15

Id. at 1359.
Alina Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of CrimeBased Deportation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 182, (2018).
17
Id.
18
Elizabeth Oh, American Immigration Laws Have Always Been About Preserving
Whiteness, NEW AM., (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/americanimmigration-laws-have-always-been-about-preserving-whiteness/
[https://perma.cc/QF26-G4WT].
19
D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed Through
History, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-history/
[https ://perma.cc/K7F8-BUGV].
20
Oh, supra note 18.
21
See Das, supra note 16, at 180.
22
Id.
16
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immigration and citizenship until 1965.23 Though our immigration laws
today may not be racially discriminatory on their face, many modern
policies similarly aim to restrict immigration by race, ethnicity, or religion.
For example, in 2017, then-President Trump’s travel ban barred travel from
seven predominantly Muslim countries.24
While many early immigration laws barred immigrants based on race,
criminal history also became an early ground of inadmissibility.25 Congress
first began drafting concrete laws that were more restrictive to noncitizens
with criminal histories in the nineteenth century.26 In many ways, the focus
on crime in immigration law was another approach to racial engineering.27
For example, animus towards Chinese immigrants in California prompted
the California legislators to label Chinese men as kidnappers and Chinese
women as presumptive prostitutes in the 1870 Anti-Kidnapping Act, labels
which made immigrants inadmissible under the “good moral character”
requirement.28 Eventually, in 1875, Congress passed a statute which barred
“convicts and prostitutes” from entering the country.29 In the twentieth
century, anti-immigrant sentiment largely turned against Mexican
immigrants, a group which politicians have continuously targeted as a
scapegoat for the country’s growing drug crime problem.30
Furthermore, the first deportation proceedings in the United States were
closely linked to the criminal system.31 When the United States government
first began actively deporting people in 1917, the deportations were carried

23

Id.
Muslim Travel Ban, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN DEP’T OF HIST. COLL. OF
LIBERAL
ARTS
(2019),
https://immigrationhistory.org/item/muslim-travel-ban/
[https://perma.cc/MDT3-X7BQ].
25
See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1359.
26
Id.
27
See Das, supra note 16, at 183.
28
Id.
29
See Padilla v. Ky., 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010).
30
See Das, supra note 16, at 187.
31
Id. at 177–79.
24
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out against immigrants who were convicted of crimes after arriving in the
United States.32 In 1891, Congress passed a law excluding immigrants who
had been convicted of crimes “involving moral turpitude,” which later
became a ground for deportation in 1922.33 That same year, narcotics
offenses also became grounds for deportation.34 In 1952, Congress enacted
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which created sweeping
reforms to immigration law and is still considered the blueprint of
immigration law today.35 The INA expanded upon numerous provisions for
drug crime-based deportation to include those who abuse or are addicted to
drugs, as well as any individual whom immigration officers had reason to
believe had illicitly trafficked drugs.36 Furthermore, the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 established that conviction for an “aggravated felony” was a
ground for mandatory detention and deportation.37
While deportation proceedings have expanded dramatically in recent
decades to encompass anyone who is “unlawfully present” without legal
status, deportation proceedings are still heavily linked to the criminal
system and reflect an attempt to crack down on crime.38 Today, the vast
majority of deportations are still triggered by criminal offenses. 39 U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reported that 92 percent of
interior deportations in 2020 were carried out against individuals with
32

See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1359.
See Das, supra note 16, at 179.
34
Id.
35
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 10,
2019), https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/legislation/immigration-and-nationalityact [https://perma.cc/7Z3B-5X3K]; id. at 188.
36
Das, supra note 16, at 188.
37
Id. at 189.
38
See Andrew Chung, In Win for Trump, U.S. Supreme Court Makes Deporting
Immigrants for Crimes Easier, REUTERS (April 23, 2020, 7:16 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-deportation/in-win-for-trump-u-s-supremecourt-makes-deporting-immigrants-for-crimes-easier-idUSKCN2252F6
[https://perma.cc/M6G7-ESCW].
39
See ICE Stats., U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T (May 12, 2021),
https://www.ice.gov/remove/statistics [https://perma.cc/888P-PPEX].
33
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criminal convictions or pending criminal charges, which, according to the
agency, “demonstrat[ed] ICE ERO’s commitment to removing those who
pose the greatest risk to the safety and security of the United States.” 40
The following section discusses what typically occurs when crime
triggers deportation. The first step in the deportation process begins when
ICE finds a person who is potentially deportable through interactions with
the criminal system.41 This usually happens when local law enforcement
agencies, like police, sheriffs, highway patrol, or transit agencies, give
arrest information to ICE.42 Some local law enforcement agencies allow
ICE to physically look for undocumented people or noncitizens detained in
jails and prisons.43 Additionally, some policies allow local law enforcement
to act as ICE agents in arresting noncitizens for immigration violations. 44
The cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and ICE allows
immigration officers to transfer people to ICE facilities, or to apprehend
people the moment they are released from criminal custody.45
Once the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) locates a person who
is a noncitizen and may be deportable, DHS will decide whether or not it is
a priority to deport the person.46 DHS exercises prosecutorial discretion in
deportations, meaning that immigration agents can choose to not pursue
deportation immediately because of agency priorities.47 Historically, DHS
has prioritized the deportation of “criminal” noncitizens over “noncriminal” noncitizens, which the agency has justified by its alleged concern
40

Id. ERO stands for “Enforcement and Removal Operations.” It is a branch of ICE that
conducts arrests, detention, and removal of noncitizens.
41
EM PUHL, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., OVERVIEW OF THE DEPORTATION
PROCESS: A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS & ADVOCATES 2 (2018),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/overview_deport_process-20181221.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9M4G-HUWL].
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 4.
47
Id.
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for national security and public safety.48 In May of 2021, the principal legal
advisor to ICE issued a memorandum on immigration enforcement and
removal priorities, noting that noncitizens who have been convicted of
aggravated felonies or criminal gang activity pose a threat to public safety
and constitute a “priority category” for deportation.49
Once DHS decides to initiate a removal case against a noncitizen, the
agency issues a Notice to Appear with an immigration court.50 In
immigration court, a noncitizen can present a defense to being deported,
either by proving that they are in fact a U.S. citizen, that they have not
violated immigration laws, or that they have a pending application for
immigration relief.51 During the first Master Calendar Hearing, DHS has
the burden of proving that a person can be deported because they are not a
citizen and have violated United States immigration laws.52 In order to meet
this burden, DHS need only establish the country where the person was
born.53 If the immigration judge determines that a person is deportable, the
person may attend an individual hearing to apply for immigration status,
typically based on family relationships, fear of persecution, and length of
time in the United States.54
The problem for noncitizens who apply for immigration relief in
deportation proceedings is that immigration judges and agencies exercise

48

AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR.. UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
IN
IMMIGRATION
LAW
(2011),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/understanding-prosecutorialdiscretion-immigration-law [https://perma.cc/27EZ-JNB8].
49
JOHN D. TRASVINA, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM FROM U.S.,
INTERIM GUIDANCE TO OPLA ATTORNEYS REGARDING CIVIL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
AND
REMOVAL
POLICIES
AND
PRIORITIES
(2021),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_interimguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/C365-HNRU].
50
See PUHL, supra note 41, at 4.
51
Id. at 4–5.
52
Id. at 5.
53
Id.
54
Id.
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broad adjudicative discretion in granting or denying petitions. 55 In their
exercise of discretion, an immigration judge balances the social and humane
considerations in a noncitizen’s favor against the adverse factors
“evidencing his undesirability as a permanent resident.”56 Unsurprisingly,
criminal history of a noncitizen is listed as one of the negative factors
considered in discretionary analyses.57
The Board of Immigration Appeals held in Matter of Arai that:
[w]here adverse factors are present in a given application, it may
be necessary for the applicant to offset these by a showing of
unusual or even outstanding equities. Generally, favorable factors
such as family ties, hardship, length of residence in the United
States, etc., will be considered as countervailing factors meriting
favorable exercise of administrative discretion. In the absence of
adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily be granted, still as a
matter of discretion.58
However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has also held that
there are some cases in which adverse considerations are so serious that not
even outstanding equities warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. 59 The
BIA states certain adverse considerations include serious drug offenses, any
other single “serious crime,” or a succession of crimes “which together
establish a pattern of serious criminal misconduct.”60 As such, noncitizens
in deportation proceedings face extreme difficulties in overcoming the
prejudice of past criminal convictions, even when they can show
rehabilitation and other positive equities.

55

Policy Manual: Chapter 8 - Discretionary Analysis, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Sept. 8, 2022), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-e-chapter-8
[https://perma.cc/3J3Q-YGMU].
56
Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195 (BIA 1990).
57
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 55.
58
Matter of Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494, 496 (BIA 1970).
59
Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195 (BIA 1990).
60
Id. at 195-96.
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III. THE QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
The previous discussion establishes how the immigration system has
always operated to expel and exclude noncitizens with criminal histories
from the United States. This is just one example of many demonstrating the
convergence of the immigration and criminal systems. The following
section discusses other critical ways in which the immigration and criminal
systems have become deeply intertwined, looking specifically at: (1) the
criminalization of immigration violations, (2) the civil detention of
immigrants, (3) the cooperation between law enforcement and immigration
enforcement, (4) the issuing of warrants for the arrest of immigrants, and
(5) the theory of deportation as punishment.
A. Criminalization of Immigration Violations
The convergence of the immigration and criminal systems is perhaps
most noticeable in the criminalization of immigration violations. 61
Unauthorized entry first became a crime in 1929 at the behest of a notorious
White supremacist U.S. Senator Coleman Livingston Blease. 62 The statute
made unauthorized entry a crime punishable by up to one year in prison, or
a felony punishable by up to two years in prison if the person had
previously been deported.63 The statute provided for prison time of up to
twenty years for unlawful reentry in the event that the person was convicted
of certain crimes before being deported.64 While Congress’s early
immigration laws established that criminal convictions carried adverse
immigration consequences, as noted in the above discussion on deportation,
it simultaneously used immigration status to create criminal acts to

61
62
63
64

See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1368.
Id.
See Das, supra note 16, at 179.
See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1369.
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prosecute and incarcerate immigrants.65 That is to say, immigration status
was both affected by crime and could serve as an element of certain crimes.
Although some criminal immigration offenses have existed since before
modern immigration laws (following the passage of the INA), crimes of
illegal entry and reentry were not heavily prosecuted until the 1990s and
2000s.66 In just a few short decades, however, immigration crimes have
surpassed even drug crimes as the most commonly arrested and prosecuted
federal offenses.67 In fact, immigration crimes accounted for half of all
federal arrests in 2014.68 In 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged
25,426 defendants with felony Illegal Reentry and 80,866 defendants with
misdemeanor Improper Entry.69
In addition to unlawful entry, noncitizen smuggling has become one of
the most commonly prosecuted immigration violations. 70 The INA sets
forth immigration offenses in Section 1324(a), which “makes it an offense
for any person who—knowing that a person is [a noncitizen], to bring to or
attempts to bring to the United States in any manner…” 71 While the general
public might assume that noncitizen smuggling provisions are intended to
cover “coyotes” who assist immigrants in crossing United States borders for
monetary gain, the broad language of the statute casts a much wider net. 72
65

See Das, supra note 16, at 179.
Id. at 190.
67
John Gramlich & Kristen Bialik, Immigration Offenses Make Up a Growing Share of
Federal Arrests, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/04/10/immigration-offenses-make-up-a-growing-share-of-federal-arrests/
[https ://perma.cc/H7M7-7SLG].
68
Id.
69
Department of Justice Prosecuted a Record-Breaking Number of Immigration-Related
Cases in Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF PUB. AFFS. (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-prosecuted-record-breaking-numberimmigration-related-cases-fiscal-year [https://perma.cc/X5YS-MX2T].
70
See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1369. This crime is statutorily defined as “Alien
Smuggling,” but I have changed the language to avoid using derogatory phrases.
71
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i).
72
Alison Kamhi & Rachel Prandini, Alien Smuggling: What it is and how it can Affect
Immigrants,
IMMIGR.
LEGAL
RES.
CTR.
1
(July
2017),
66
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Under the statutory language, a mother helping her young children cross the
border without inspection could be charged with noncitizen smuggling so
long as she knows that they are entering unlawfully.73 In 2019, 4,297
defendants were charged with noncitizen smuggling, which reflected an
increase of 15.4 percent from the previous year.74
Due to the non-harmful and nonviolent nature of immigration violations,
many political leaders have called for decriminalization.75 Advocates for
decriminalization note that the prosecution of immigration violations has
contributed to family separation at the border, as children are not permitted
to stay in criminal custody with parents who are facing criminal charges.76
In August of 2021, a district judge in Nevada ruled that section 1326 of the
United States Code, establishing unlawful reentry as a felony, was
unconstitutional.77 Judge Du found that Section 1326 was enacted with a
discriminatory purpose, had a disparate impact on Latine persons, and
would not have been enacted absent racial animus.78 Though this ruling
reflects a positive shift towards decriminalizing immigration violations, it is
still only one step of many needed to detangle the criminal system from the
immigration system.
B. Civil Detention of Immigrants
Another area in which the immigration system resembles a more punitive
system is in the civil detention of immigrants.79 While ICE officials have
maintained that immigration detention, much like deportation, “is not
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/alien_smuggling_practice_advisory20170718.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WE5-S8U5]. “Coyote” is a colloquial term for a person
who brings migrants across the U.S.-Mexico border, typically in exchange for money.
73
Id.
74
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF PUB. AFFS, supra note 69.
75
See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1370.
76
Id.
77
United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 555 F. Supp. 3d 996, 996 (D. Nev. 2021).
78
Id. at 1000-01.
79
See Valdez, supra note 7, at 1366–67.
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punishment,”80 immigration detention shares many characteristics with
criminal incarceration.81 Noncitizens in immigration detention are often
represented as a threat to public safety, and as such, are confined in remote
facilities encircled by barbed wire and subjected to the same monitored
control seen in jails and prisons.82 Oftentimes, people in immigration
detention who may be merely awaiting their next court date to determine
their legal status are detained alongside those serving sentences for criminal
convictions.83
Immigration detention facilities tend to resemble the nation’s jails and
prisons, both in design and operation. Many of the facilities that ICE uses to
detain immigrants were originally built and operated as prisons to confine
pre-trial and sentenced felons.84 Unsurprisingly, ICE has largely adopted
standards based on corrections law.85 For example, both immigration
detention centers and prisons are highly secured environments in which
guards monitor and regulate the detainees’ movement, meals, personal and
attorney visits, access to medical providers, and virtually all other aspects of
life.86 Furthermore, investigations into detention centers have found that
ICE officers have been known to conduct strip-searches on detainees87 and
place detainees in solitary confinement.88 Many scholars conclude that such
80

César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention As Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1351 (2014).
81
Id. at 1349.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1384.
85
DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
4
(2009),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3HKU-QZAC].
86
See García Hernandez, supra note 80, at 1383–84.
87
Id. at 1384.
88
See Invisible in Isolation: The Use of Segregation and Solitary Confinement in
Immigration Detention, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. 3 (Sept. 2012),
https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/report-invisible-isolation-use-segregationand-solitary-confinement-immigration [https://perma.cc/Q4N3-FYU3].
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an environment is inappropriately penal for the majority of detainees,
making it unfit for the permissible purposes of immigration custody. 89
C. Cooperation Between Law Enforcement and Immigration Enforcement
The cooperation between law enforcement and immigration enforcement
agencies has further pushed the immigration system in a more punitive
direction. In recent years, DHS has increasingly relied on state and local
law enforcement to locate deportable noncitizens through a complex web of
programs and information exchange.90 Many state and local programs give
ICE physical and technological access to jails and prisons, most notably
through the Criminal Alien Program.91 Furthermore, the National Crime
Information Center provides immigration status information on those
stopped and questioned by police, which is made available to police
through online databases.92 ICE agents also engage in informal but broad
collaboration with local law enforcement. Police officers have been known
to call immigration officers after stopping drivers without licenses, and ICE
agents have accompanied police officers in their work and participated at
traffic checkpoints.93 Furthermore, ICE can make hold requests, called
“detainers,” in which jails will hold a prisoner for up to 48 hours after when
she would normally be released from custody so that ICE can take custody
of that person.94
Beyond direct cooperation with law enforcement, ICE and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) have been known to use increasingly invasive and
covert methods of locating deportable noncitizens. Controversy arose in
89

See García Hernandez, supra note 80 at 1357.
NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., HOW ICE USES LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS TO
FUNNEL PEOPLE INTO THE DETENTION AND DEPORTATION SYSTEM (2014),
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/localjusticeandice/
[https://perma.cc/98JP-UXVB].
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
90
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recent history when a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request revealed
that ICE had been using a vast license plate database to identify and locate
vehicles associated with undocumented immigrants.95 DHS’s process of
identifying and locating deportable noncitizens largely relies on strategies
that are murky and unacceptable in other areas of law.96
In some cases, local law enforcement has usurped the role of immigration
enforcement.97 Sheriff departments nationwide were under increased
pressure to participate in an immigration crackdown after former President
Trump threatened to withhold funding from departments that did not hold
jail inmates for deportation.98 The former Sheriff of Maricopa County, Joe
Arpaio, oversaw the Sheriff’s department for 24 years through several
unlawful practices, including making stops of Latine persons based on
racial profiling and detaining people solely based on unfounded suspicion
that they may be undocumented.99 The increasing cooperation between law
enforcement and immigration enforcement resembles a punitive rather than
civil system.
D. Issuing Warrants for the Arrest of Immigrants
Immigration enforcement also resembles the criminal system in how
warrants are issued for the arrest of noncitizens who are suspected of
having committed immigration violations.

The INA provides that an

immigration officer may arrest and detain a noncitizen who is subject to
removal upon the issuance of a warrant, which can either be issued with the
95
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Notice to Appear (the charging document that initiates formal deportation
proceedings), or any time up until the deportation proceeding is
complete.100 ICE warrants are exclusively issued by and can be acted on
only by immigration officers.101 While immigration arrests generally
require ICE warrants, there are two very broad exceptions that account for a
large percentage of immigration arrests. 102 First, an immigration officer
may arrest a noncitizen who enters or attempts to enter the United States in
the presence or view of the officer.103 Second, an immigration officer may
arrest a noncitizen when they have “reason to believe” that the person is in
the United States in violation of law and is “likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained.”104 This policy has not just allowed—but
encouraged—immigration officers to engage in racial profiling when
making arrests supposedly based on probable cause.105 Per the INA, ICE
agents also have authority to conduct interrogations and brief detentions as
part of an investigation into possible immigration violations.106
Because of the penal nature of immigration warrants and arrests, the
Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures apply to immigration arrests.107 Courts have interpreted the “reason
to believe” standard for warrantless immigration arrests to be the equivalent
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of probable cause in criminal cases. 108 Because immigration officers, rather
than judges, issue immigration warrants, they do not confer the same
authority as criminal arrest warrants.109 Namely, immigration officers are
not permitted to enter a person’s home or place of work with a purely
administrative warrant.110 Regardless of these limitations, there are many
recorded cases of ICE agents illegally raiding people’s homes and places of
work, grossly exceeding their authority under administrative warrants.111
Furthermore, ICE agents have used coercion and threats of violence to enter
the homes of undocumented people who may be unaware of their right to
refuse entry.112
E. The Theory of Deportation as Punishment
Lastly, the civil versus criminal nature of the immigration system is
perhaps most debated with respect to the theory of deportation as
punishment. The Supreme Court has maintained that deportation is not
punishment for a crime since its 1893 ruling in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, writing:
The [deportation] proceeding . . . is in no proper sense a trial and
sentence for a crime or offence. It is simply the ascertainment, by
appropriate and lawful means, of the fact whether the conditions
exist upon which Congress has enacted that an alien of this class
may remain within the country. The order of deportation is not a
punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which
that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his
country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the
108
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return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with
the conditions upon the performance of which the government of
the nation, acting within its constitutional authority and through
the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to
reside here shall depend.113
Though the Supreme Court has steadfastly maintained that deportation is
not a punishment, many legal scholars consider this to be pure legal
fiction.114 In distinguishing between a remedial measure and a punishment,
courts and legal scholars consider several frameworks. One view looks at
the severity of the consequences, more severe being more punitive. 115 Other
theories of punishment are based on incapacitation, rehabilitation,
deterrence, and retribution.116 While deportation may rationally be justified
as incapacitating and deterring people from violating immigration laws,
rehabilitation is not particularly relevant as immigration violations do not
suggest moral wrongdoing. The last widely accepted theory is that
punishment serves as retribution for a prior wrongful action.117
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether deportation constitutes
punishment because it is often hard to distinguish between punitive and
remedial measures.118 The Supreme Court has maintained that deportation
is a remedial measure because the purpose is not to punish but rather “to put
an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.” 119 But what does
it mean to “put an end” to an immigration violation? Those who are
deported are uprooted from their lives and consequently often lose their
residence, livelihood, and family. Some people who arrive to the United
States as children are deported to countries that they do not remember,
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where they may not have family or speak the language.120 Deportation is
devastating not only to people who are removed but to their families who
are left behind. Depression, anxiety, and severe psychological distress
increase in children following the detention or deportation of a parent.121
Doctors have noticed symptoms of toxic stress in children due to fear that a
family member will be deported.122
The devastating consequences of deportation on noncitizens and their
families suggests, in itself, that deportation is punitive. Other legal scholars
go further to argue that the statutory framework of deportation is inherently
penal for several reasons.123 First, under the current statutory scheme, a
person convicted of an aggravated felony is automatically deportable.124
This is true also for those who make a false claim to U.S. citizenship and
those guilty of noncitizen “smuggling.”125 In these cases, deportation is a
strict punishment for violation of the law as there is no consideration of
remedial purposes. Furthermore, deportation banishes a person permanently
from the United States.126 If deportation were remedial, a person removed
from the country would only be barred from entering so long as they posed
a threat to the safety or welfare of the country.127 This is not the case,
suggesting that deportation is punitive rather than remedial.
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Under the Constitution, any punishment imposed must be proportionate
to the offense.128 If deportation is a punishment, as so many legal scholars
believe, so many deportations carried out over the years would undoubtedly
be considered cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Some legal
scholars argue that a removal order should trigger constitutional
proportionality review, especially when it results from a criminal conviction
because the Supreme Court maintained in Padilla v. Kentucky that
deportation is integrally linked to “the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”129
Under the Constitution, any punishment imposed must be proportionate
to the offense.130 If deportation is a punishment, as so many legal scholars
believe, many deportations carried out over the years would undoubtedly be
considered cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Some legal
scholars argue that a removal order should trigger constitutional
proportionality review, especially when it results from a criminal conviction
because the Supreme Court maintained in Padilla v. Kentucky that
deportation is integrally linked to “the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”131
IV. WHEN ARE NONCITIZENS FORCED TO SELF-INCRIMINATE IN THE
DEPORTATION PROCESS?
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement
officers are required to read Fifth Amendment rights to people in custody
prior to interrogation.132 Subsequent interpretations of Miranda expanded
“interrogation” to include any questioning by an officer that is “reasonably

128
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likely to elicit an incriminating response.”133 Furthermore, one later
Supreme Court case clarified that Miranda applies when civil law
enforcement

agents—not

just

criminal

law

enforcement—question

134

individuals.

The lack of warnings regarding noncitizens’ constitutional rights,
particularly the right to remain silent in response to incriminating questions,
sets the stage for deportation proceedings built on misunderstanding and
coercion. There is a common misunderstanding among new immigrants that
constitutional protections do not apply to undocumented people and,
consequently, many people do not invoke their right to remain silent. 135
Regarding deportation proceedings, noncitizens are often forced to selfincriminate in two areas. First, a noncitizen may be asked to testify about
their immigration status, which may open them to criminal liability for
immigration-related crimes.136 Second, a noncitizen may be asked to testify
about criminal conduct unrelated to immigration status, as criminal
convictions may create a basis for deportability.137 Deportation proceedings
in immigration court are not the only place where noncitizens are asked to
disclose criminal conduct.138 For example, on Form I-485, which is the
application for permanent resident status, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services asks a series of questions on inadmissibility, including: “Have you
EVER committed a crime of any kind (even if you were not arrested, cited,
charged with, or tried for that crime)?”139
133

U.S. v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1982).
Sophie Kosmacher, When Does Questioning Related to Immigration Status Constitute
A Miranda Interrogation?, 69 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 80, 85 (2021).
135
See Matthew Green, What Legal Rights Do Undocumented Immigrants Have? (With
Lesson Plan), KQED (Mar. 28, 2017) https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/26358/what-legalrights-do-undocumented-immigrants-have-with-lesson-plan
[https://perma.cc/62DUR3U6].
136
Valdez, supra note 7, at 1373.
137
Id.
138
Id. (Assumption that this is correct)
139
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR ADJUST STATUS (July 15,
134

VOLUME 21 • ISSUE 1 • 2022

72

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Noncitizens are faced with tough choices when asked to incriminate
themselves. As with any other civil proceeding, a noncitizen in a
deportation proceeding may choose not to testify in response to any
question that he reasonably believes may tend to incriminate him. 140
However, the choice to plead the Fifth Amendment may or may not be
beneficial, depending on the circumstances, and especially depending on
who bears the burden of proof. On the one hand, the government bears the
initial burden of proof to establish a noncitizen’s deportability, and there is
a strong incentive to remain silent in response to incriminating questions. 141
On the other hand, there are situations wherein the noncitizen bears the
burden of proving eligibility for immigration relief, and remaining silent
may show lack of candor, ultimately resulting in a discretionary denial. 142
As previously mentioned, the greatest divergence from the protections
offered to criminal defendants lies in how courts interpret a noncitizen’s
silence. Respondents in deportation proceedings generally cannot be
compelled to testify about matters that could form the basis of criminal
charges.143 However, immigration courts have in the past interpreted silence
as an admission of guilt in the absence of probative evidence from the
government.144 For example, in Gutierrez v. Holder, the judge asked the
noncitizen respondent if he was driving on a suspended license, to which
the noncitizen invoked his right to remain silent.145 The judge then made a
finding—based only on his silence—that he was driving with a suspended
license.146
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The same is generally not true when noncitizens are asked to testify
solely about their immigration status. In Matter of Guevara, the Board of
Immigration Appeals held that the government could not use the
respondent’s silence, in the absence of other proof, in order to meet its
burden of proving the respondent’s noncitizen status. 147 While silence alone
cannot establish alienage, it can be used to build the government’s case
against a noncitizen, especially where criminal acts form the basis of the
deportation proceeding.
V. EXPANDING FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS TO IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
The above discussion establishes that noncitizens in deportation
proceedings are subjected to a system that largely resembles the criminal
system while receiving virtually none of the constitutional safeguards
afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings. Given the increasingly
penal nature of the immigration system, justice requires that we expand
protections against self-incrimination to respondents facing deportation.
With respect to Fifth Amendment rights, our current system of immigration
enforcement is deficient in two main areas: (1) immigration enforcement
officers are not currently required to inform noncitizens of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination when they are taken into
custody and questioned; and (2) immigration judges currently may draw
adverse inferences when a noncitizen invokes their right to remain silent in
immigration court.148 As such, this article proposes two amendments to the
current system to promote constitutional protections against selfincrimination: first, expanding the Miranda warning requirement to
immigration enforcement, and second, prohibiting immigration judges from
drawing adverse inferences from noncitizens’ silence.
147
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In Pleading the Fifth in Immigration Court: A Regulatory Proposal,
Tania Valdez proposes language to be added to the Code of Federal
Regulations which would limit judges’ ability to draw adverse inferences
when noncitizens invoke the right to remain silent in immigration court. 149
In addition to that regulatory proposal, this article proposes expanding
Miranda warnings to immigration enforcement to ensure that noncitizens
do not self-incriminate during their initial encounters with ICE or Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) agents. This is crucial as the rules of evidence
do not apply to immigration proceedings, and therefore noncitizens’
statements made to immigration and law enforcement officers during their
initial apprehension often become the basis for deportation.150
Miranda warnings might be expanded to the immigration context
through actions by administrative agencies. Such agencies have the power
to interpret the constitution and, therefore, may expand the Fifth
Amendment to apply to immigration proceedings through a process called
“administrative constitutionalism.” While agencies may face practical
obstacles in expanding Fifth Amendment protections, this change is
necessary to keep noncitizens informed of their rights and to safeguard
noncitizens from self-incrimination.
Historically, federal immigration officials have failed to advance
constitutional norms in their decision making.151 Executive immigration
agencies may be reluctant to engage with constitutional issues because they
operate in the shadows of the plenary power doctrine, which gives broad
discretion to Congress in crafting immigration law.152 Consequently, even
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when constitutional norms are implicated in immigration proceedings,
immigration agencies may not fully apply those norms.153
Some legal scholars argue that the authority to engage in constitutional
interpretation lies exclusively with the judicial branch.154 However, most
scholars reject this view.155 Constitutional interpretation is instead widely
understood to be a “collaborative enterprise” between branches of
government, including the executive branch, though the Supreme Court is
the ultimate authority on constitutional questions.156 The ability of
administrative agencies to interpret constitutional issues may be limited by
certain efficiency concerns when agency interpretations undermine existing
government processes.157
However, there are executive immigration agencies that are specifically
tasked with not only enforcing immigration law but also with creating law
through binding precedent.158 For example, the BIA adjudicates
immigration cases (particularly deportation and detention cases) through a
quasi-judicial process.159 As such, the “ministerial efficiency” concern does
not directly apply to agencies like the BIA that are specifically tasked with
creating immigration law. For that reason, the BIA would be particularly
well-suited for expanding the scope of Fifth Amendment protections to the
immigration context. This is not to say that the BIA is the only actor in the
executive branch that might advance constitutional issues in immigration
law. For example, the president has historically wielded tremendous power
to shape immigration policy independent of Congress.160 However; the BIA
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is likely the best agency to shape immigration law because of its unique
adjudicative role.
A. First Proposal – Expanding Miranda Warnings to Immigration
Enforcement
First, this article proposes that Miranda v. Arizona be expanded to apply
to Department of Homeland Security immigration enforcement officers,
namely ICE and CBP officers, so that they are required to read Miranda
warnings to noncitizens who have been taken into immigration custody
before questioning said noncitizens about immigration status and criminal
history. As discussed in the previous sections, a frequent first step in
initiating a deportation proceeding occurs when a noncitizen is apprehended
by an immigration officer, either at or near a land border by CBP officers or
following an arrest pursuant to a search warrant granted to ICE. 161
As such, the first element of this proposal requires immigration
enforcement officers to read Miranda warnings to noncitizens who are
taken into immigration custody for questioning their immigration status and
criminal history. A noncitizen is in “custody” when they are stopped,
arrested, or otherwise detained by an immigration officer for suspected
immigration or criminal violation.162 An “interrogation” is any questioning
conducted by a law enforcement or immigration officer that is likely to
elicit an incriminating response.163 As such, if an immigration enforcement
officer arrests a noncitizen, either within United States borders pursuant to a
warrant, or otherwise apprehends a noncitizen for a suspected immigration
or criminal violation, the officer should be required to read a Miranda
warning before questioning the noncitizen about their immigration status or
criminal history.
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Because not all language in a standard Miranda warning applies to
immigration

proceedings—particularly

language

about

an

indigent

defendant’s right to counsel164 — immigration officers should be required
to read the warning as follows:
You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions.
Anything you say may be used against you in a court of law. You
have the right to consult an attorney before speaking to police or
immigration officers and to have an attorney present during
questioning now or in the future. However, an attorney will not be
provided for you. If you decide to answer questions now without
an attorney present, you have the right to stop answering at any
time until you speak to an attorney. Knowing and understanding
your rights as I have explained them to you, are you willing to
answer questions without an attorney present?
Consistent with previous Ninth Circuit rulings, the Miranda warning
must be “meaningful,” meaning that the person being interrogated must
understand their rights so that they can knowingly act on them. 165 As such,
if the noncitizen is not proficient in English, the warning shall be read to
them in their native language.
This policy change may be enacted in a number of ways. As discussed
above, because of its adjudicative nature, the BIA is likely in the best
position to interpret the scope of the Fifth Amendment in the immigration
context through case precedent. However, because the Supreme Court has
ultimate authority and already held in United States v. Valdez that Miranda
warnings are not required for immigration stops, it is unlikely that the BIA
will have the authority to interpret the Fifth Amendment as requiring such
warnings.166 For that reason, immigration enforcement agencies will likely
have to make this change internally.
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For example, the director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) may issue a memorandum for ICE Field Office Directors outlining a
revision to the Detention and Removal Operations Policy and Procedure
Manual. The memorandum shall note that two conditions—custody and
interrogation—trigger Miranda rights and require ICE officers to read the
above statement to noncitizens in their custody. Similarly, CBP shall add a
section to Chapters 21, 22, and 23 of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Inspector’s Field Manual, which deal with land border, airport,
and seaport inspection procedures, respectively.167 The section shall
similarly describe an officer’s duty to read Miranda warnings to noncitizens
in CBP custody prior to being interrogated about immigration status or
criminal history. Furthermore, the practice of reading Miranda warnings to
noncitizens stopped, and question for suspected immigration violations
should be integrated into Federal Law Enforcement Training of ICE and
CBP officers.
Opponents of expanding Miranda warnings to immigration enforcement
may argue that requiring immigration officers to inform noncitizens of their
right to remain silent will slow down an already incredibly backlogged
system. However, this proposal does not actually expand the right against
self-incrimination as noncitizens already have the right to remain silent
when questioned by immigration enforcement officers.168 This proposal
simply requires that immigration officers inform noncitizens of that right
before questioning them.
Furthermore, many noncitizens apprehended by immigration officers at
United States borders will choose to waive this right. Since 2014, there has
been a sharp increase in children and families seeking asylum in the United
167
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States, and these people “generally turn themselves in to the Border Patrol
immediately upon crossing the border and ask to access the asylum
process.”169

In other words, for many noncitizens encountering

immigration enforcement upon entry to the United States, there is a strong
incentive to speak to officers as it might help in obtaining immigration
relief such as asylum or humanitarian parole.
Opponents of this proposal may also note that the Supreme Court already
determined in Valdez that immigration enforcement officers are not
required to read Miranda warnings to noncitizens.170 However, in failing to
expand Miranda safeguards to immigration enforcement agencies, the
Supreme Court not only failed to follow precedent in Mathis, which held
that Miranda warnings were required in some civil matters, but also failed
to consider circumstances that make Miranda warnings particularly crucial
in immigration enforcement matters.171
One argument for expanding Miranda warnings is that many
immigration violations also constitute criminal charges punishable by
prison sentences.172 In 2014, half of all federal arrests were for immigration
offenses such as felony Illegal Reentry and “Alien Smuggling.” 173 As such,
when a CBP or ICE officer questions a noncitizen about a suspected
immigration violation, there is a substantial risk that this questioning will
trigger criminal charges. The Supreme Court has held that Miranda
warnings should be required when law enforcement officers ask questions
that are “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” 174 When an
immigration officer compels a noncitizen to admit that they entered

169
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unlawfully or helped their children enter unlawfully, the officer is eliciting
an incriminating response that could potentially expose the noncitizen to
criminal charges.
Another argument in support of Miranda warnings is that they are
already being applied following some arrests for “dual civil-criminal
immigration inquiries.”175 Many circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit,
have taken a highly subjective approach to determine when immigration
officers are required to read Miranda warnings.176 One approach looks at
the intent of the officer and whether the officer suspected a civil or criminal
violation.177 Another approach examines whether the officer should have
known that the questioning was likely to elicit incriminating information. 178
Considering the proliferation of criminal immigration violations, officers
should be required to give Miranda warnings any time they question a
noncitizen about their immigration status. Furthermore, the current unequal
application of Miranda warnings creates confusion and inconsistency
within immigration enforcement practices. Establishing a uniform practice
wherein all immigration officers are required to read Miranda warnings
before questioning noncitizens would cure this deficiency, save judicial
resources, and foster consistency in immigration enforcement.
Third, it is particularly important to protect noncitizens’ rights against
self-incrimination in their initial interactions with immigration enforcement
officers, as evidence of these interactions are generally admissible in
immigration court.179 In fact, the strict rules of evidence do not apply in
immigration proceedings as they do in civil or criminal proceedings.180 The
175
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Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Benchbook states that
“[t]he general rule with respect to evidence in immigration proceedings
favors admissibility as long as the evidence is shown to be probative of
relevant matters and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the
[noncitizen] of due process of law.”181 In other words, evidence gathered by
immigration officers is generally admissible in immigration court since the
rules of evidence do not apply.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court and many Board of Immigration
Appeals decisions have held that illegally obtained evidence is, in some
cases, admissible to prove noncitizen status.182 For example, in INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court denied a motion to suppress evidence
of a noncitizen’s immigration status that was gathered following INS’s
unlawful raid of the noncitizen’s workplace without a warrant. 183 Requiring
immigration enforcement officers to read Miranda warnings reduces the
likelihood that illegally obtained evidence, or evidence obtained under
duress, will be admissible in court.
Finally, there is a common misunderstanding among immigrant
communities that constitutional protections do not apply to noncitizens, and
the Trump administration’s tough-on-immigration stance has largely
contributed to this misunderstanding.184 A 2017 study conducted by the
Annenberg Public Policy Center found that of 1,013 adults in the United
States, 53 percent think that undocumented people do not have any rights
under the Constitution.185 Requiring immigration officers to read Miranda
warnings to apprehended noncitizens would immediately correct this
181
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misunderstanding and allow noncitizens to make informed decisions about
what information, if any, they wish to disclose to immigration officers.
B. Second Proposal – A Noncitizen’s Right to Remain Silent in Immigration
Court
In addition to expanding Miranda warnings to immigration enforcement,
this article proposes safeguards prohibiting judges from drawing adverse
inferences as to a noncitizen’s immigration status or criminal history when
the noncitizen invokes their right to remain silent in the absence of any
government evidence of noncitizen status or criminal history. Even if
Miranda warnings are required preceding interrogations by immigration
enforcement, the problem remains that many noncitizens are often
pressured to self-incriminate in immigration court. Unlike in criminal
proceedings, a respondent in a deportation proceeding does not have the
choice of whether to testify.186 Immigration proceedings are distinct from
criminal proceedings in that immigration judges may compel noncitizens to
testify or be held in contempt.187 Section 242(b) of the INA allows both
immigration judges and prosecutors to interrogate noncitizens in
immigration court,188 though the power to interrogate does not necessarily
include the power to compel a witness to answer. 189 Furthermore, if a
noncitizen has a valid claim of self-incrimination, they may choose not to
testify in response to particular questions.190 However, many respondents in
deportation proceedings are not aware of this right to remain silent. 191 To
address that issue, this article suggests implementing a procedural
requirement that immigration judges inform respondents of their right
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against self-incrimination and ability to remain silent in response to any
incriminating question.
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) interprets federal immigration
statutes and includes a section on the rules of procedure in immigration
court.192 In order to expand Fifth Amendment protections in immigration
court, the Executive Office of Immigration Review could propose a new
rule that would be inserted into this section. The proposed language reads as
follows:
Advising the Respondent of the Right to Silence.
(a) At the master calendar hearing, before taking the respondent’s
testimony, the immigration judge shall ensure that the respondent
has been advised of their right to remain silent in response to
questions regarding immigration status or criminal activity.
(b) Where an immigration judge finds
failed to read Miranda warnings to
interrogation, any statements obtained
shall not be admissible to establish the
status.

that immigration officers
the respondent prior to
during that interrogation
respondent’s immigration

(c) An immigration judge shall not make an adverse inference, in
the absence of government proof, when the respondent chooses to
remain silent in response to questions about criminal history.
(d) When the government bears the burden of proof to establish the
respondent’s alienage, an immigration judge shall not make an
adverse inference, in the absence of government proof, when the
respondent chooses to remain silent in response to questions about
alienage.
Critics of this proposal might argue that expanding Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination to immigration proceedings will slow
down an already incredibly overburdened system. It is true that immigration
courts are incredibly impacted; most immigration judges preside over, on
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average, more than 2,200 immigration cases every year.193 However, the
same justifications for requiring immigration officers to read Miranda
warnings also apply to the proposed regulations in immigration court
procedure. In the absence of government proof, immigration judges are
already barred from drawing adverse inferences when noncitizens remain
silent in response to questions about their place of birth and citizenship. 194
This part of the proposal is not adding any novel requirements, it is just
adding already established case law to the CFR to hold immigration judges
accountable.
Immigration judges are permitted, on the other hand, to draw adverse
inferences from silence in response to questions about criminal history.195
While this does add a new procedural requirement to immigration court
proceedings that may cause delays in certain cases, the same could be said
about the right to remain silent in criminal cases. The reason why we
uphold the Fifth Amendment so strongly in criminal cases is that we regard
it as a fundamental tenant of American law. 196 The same justifications for
the Fifth Amendment are relevant to immigration court. So often,
deportation proceedings directly result from and are intimately intertwined
with noncitizens’ interactions with the criminal system. 197 Given the
criminal-civil overlap, and the increasingly punitive nature of the criminal
system, the same constitutional protection against self-incrimination is
warranted in immigration court.
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There are many situations, especially at the outset of a deportation
proceeding, when a noncitizen will choose to remain silent. There are also
many situations in immigration court when noncitizens have a stronger
incentive to speak rather than remain silent, even in response to some
“incriminating” questions. In immigration court, the government bears the
initial burden of proof of establishing that the noncitizen is deportable.198
Once the government has met that burden, it shifts to the noncitizen to
establish their eligibility for immigration relief.199 In this situation, there is
little incentive to remain silent to any question.200 When applying for
cancellation of removal, asylum, or similar relief, part of showing eligibility
is necessarily showing that the noncitizen does not have lawful immigration
status.201 Furthermore, showing candor, remorse, and rehabilitation
regarding past crimes all count as positive equities in an immigration
application.202 Many noncitizens may therefore forego their right to plead
the fifth during deportation proceedings, so the concern of slowing down
proceedings does not outweigh the benefits of adding these constitutional
and procedural safeguards.
It is also worth noting that the backlog in the immigration system already
exists, independent of any added procedures. This is a signal that we need
to reduce caseloads in immigration court by halting deportations, especially
against people with “low priority” cases. EOIR attorneys can increase their
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, choosing to not initiate deportation
proceedings against noncitizens who (1) have remained in the United States
for many years, (2) have extensive family and community ties in the United
States, (3) have limited or no criminal history, and (4) present other
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humanitarian considerations, such as hardships to the noncitizen or their
family.203
VI. CONCLUSION
The increasingly punitive nature of immigration enforcement calls for
greater constitutional protections. The “quasi-criminal” deportation process
is evidenced by the criminalization of immigration offenses, the civil
detention of immigrants, the issuance of arrest warrants for immigrants, the
cooperation between law enforcement and immigration enforcement, and
the theory that deportation is a form of punishment. Because the rules of
evidence do not apply to deportation proceedings, noncitizens are
particularly vulnerable to self-incrimination when they are apprehended and
questioned by immigration officers. In order to protect the constitutional
rights of noncitizens, administrative and immigration enforcement agencies
must work to expand the scope of the Fifth Amendment to the context of
immigration enforcement. These steps are critical to achieving a more just
immigration system.

203

U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Prosecutorial Discretion and the ICE
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), https://www.ice.gov/aboutice/opla/prosecutorial-discretion [https://perma.cc/DD9S-G6RZ] (last updated Aug. 23,
2021).

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

